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Abstract
Dynamic principal-agent settings with asymmetric information but no commit-
ment are well known to create a ratchet e ect. Here, the most e cient agents must
be provided with extra ‘information rent’ as an incentive to relinquish their informa-
tional advantage over an uninformed principal; this causes welfare to fall. We study
this problem in the case of regulatory procurement and show that delegation by the
government to an independent regulator whose preferences di er from the govern-
ment’s can overcome this ine ciency, and we provide ‘conservative’ conditions under
which this happens. Our solution reﬂects several aspects of many modern regulatory
settings: government commitment to a particular regulator, the provision of indepen-
dence to that regulator, and heterogeneity across available regulators. Our results also
provide an analogy with the literatures on the beneﬁts of delegation to independent
principals in other settings, such as monetary policy, ﬁnancial regulation and trade
and hence contribute to this broader research agenda.
JEL Classiﬁcation: L51
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The merits of delegation to an independent regulatory authority in areas as diverse as
monetary policy and public utilities have been widely observed over the past three decades.
In a long run dynamic relationship with asymmetric information, where commitment to a
long run contract is not possible and early contracts reveal information about the regulated
ﬁrm, subsequent contracts are likely to include a set of tougher performance standards.
That is, the problem of the ‘ratchet e ect’ is inclined to emerge. As a result, e cient
ﬁrms are unwilling to reveal this characteristic and the regulator must induce them to do
so by o ering an increase in information rent. This can prove harmful to the economy
depending, for example, on the weight placed on rent savings into the future (Brown et al.
(1994)) and on the degree of coordination costs faced by the regulator.1 The ratchet e ect
is an instance of a time inconsistency problem.
The time inconsistency problem in extensive form games has been raised by di erent
strands of the literature, such as the theory of the ﬁrm (where ex ante decisions with in-
complete contracts ﬁgure prominently), or macroeconomic policy (see Levine et al. (2005)
for a summary). There are many examples of time inconsistency problems in monetary
policy or ﬁscal policy, starting with Rogo  (1985). Indeed, recently, time inconsistency
problems have been arguably at the core of the regulatory weaknesses that were behind
of the 2008 world ﬁnancial crisis.2 Kahn and Santos (2005) addresses some of the issues
involved for bank regulation.
A number of measures have been suggested in the literature to limit the ratchet ef-
fect; measures including contractible investment, low-powered incentive contracts o ered
by the regulator in the face of unveriﬁable quality and term limits on regulators prevent-
ing gains from the information revealed by early contracts. In this paper, we examine a
di erent solution to the problem of the ratchet e ect and we add to the literature on in-
dependent regulation, by considering the extent to which the choice of regulator matters.
In particular, we are interested to know whether delegation to an independent industry
regulator whose preferences di er from those of the government can partially substitute
1As an example of the economic costs of the ratchet e ect, Litwack (1993) argues that, when combined
with coordination costs, the ratchet e ect may have damaged Soviet productivity signiﬁcantly.
2A Special Session at the 2011 Royal Economic Society conference was devoted to the theme of “Fi-
nancial Regulation”.
1for full intertemporal commitment and, therefore, raise welfare by mitigating the ratchet
e ect. This solution combines several features of the modern regulatory environment:
government commitment to a particular regulator, the provision of independence to that
regulator, and heterogeneity across the types of regulators available. Taking commitment
ﬁrst, it is apparent that the process of appointing regulators involves a degree of commit-
ment by the government. Regulators are appointed for a speciﬁc (say, ﬁve year) period and
these terms are contractually agreed. This means that a variety of regulatory decisions
upon which governments may be unable to commit over time are handled by the same
regulator, whose style and preferences can be expected to maintain across such decisions.
It is also the case that regulators typically enjoy independence from government, and
wide powers of discretion, as is clear from the indices of regulatory independence compiled
by, for example, Gilardi (2002), Johannsen (2003), Edwards and Waverman (2006) and
Trillas and Montoya (2011). It is also clear that independence has been a long-standing
feature of numerous regulatory environments. For example, in the British context, Arm-
strong et al. (1994), p 360), describe discretion and independence as a “notable feature of
the new regulatory institutions” introduced in the 1980s and 1990s. In common with much
of the above literature, they believe that this has generated short-term gains by freeing
the industries involved from (some) political interference (see also Carsberg (1995)— a
view shared by Stelzer (1996), in the American context.) At the same time, a variety
of regulatory preferences is clearly on o er to a government/planner when deciding to
whom such independence should be granted and these preferences are clearly discernible
ex ante.3 Bearing these points in mind, Baron (Baron, 1998) and Spulber and Besanko
3One mechanism for achieving this might be the regulator’s public track-record. For example, Tom
Winsor’s ‘pro-consumer’ record before being appointed UK rail regulator in 1999 was apparent from his
work as chief legal advisor to an earlier UK rail regulator. This is clear from Gribben (1999): “John
Prescott, deputy prime minister, yesterday named a “hawkish” lawyer [Tom Winsor] to toughen up rail
regulation and make life more di cult for Railtrack and the train operating companies.” As further evidence
that Winsor’s ‘type’ was apparent ex ante, Railtrack shares fell 35 pence following, apparently credible,
announcements he made on 27 May (before taking up his post) about the forthcoming rail price review.
This happened despite Railtrack’s record proﬁts having just been announced Osborne (1999). Stelzer
suggests that, by relying on regulation by committee, the US system removes some of this “personality
e ect”. However, it need not prevent regulatory decisions from reﬂecting particular preferences, as the use
of delegation to monetary policy committees attests.
2(1992) also consider models with a choice amongst regulators whose types are observable
ex ante. Like us, they model this ‘type’ as the amount of weight given to industry proﬁts
in the regulator’s objective function. However, their interest is in the e ects of the politi-
cal process on the choice of regulator. Baron’s analysis of static incentive regulation with
asymmetric information shows that a majority voting equilibrium may sacriﬁce e ciency
for equity by selecting a regulator who places high weight on consumer surplus. This
occurs when legislators respond to their constituents’ preferences and the regulated ﬁrm
has private information about its costs. However, in the static (non-commitment) frame-
work, there is no incentive for legislators to choose a regulator whose type di ers from the
median. Spulber and Besanko show that such divergence can happen by introducing the
question of policy commitment. They compare the choice of regulator in circumstances
where she can/cannot commit to an environmental pollution standard. In a complete
information context, commitment is modelled as a Stackelberg game where the regulator
has a ﬁrst-mover advantage when choosing the pollution standard and industry output
level; non-commitment produces a Cournot-Nash equilibrium as the Stackelberg equilib-
rium ‘unravels’. Unlike the commitment case, non-commitment involves delegation to a
regulator whose preferences may not coincide with the legislature’s. The reason, as with
central bank delegation, is that the e ects of being unable to commit to policy may be
o set by a (more feasible) commitment to a related variable—the regulator’s type. Given
this result, Spulber and Besanko’s main focus is on how political interactions (between
legislature and executive) may explain observed instances of delegation.
We draw on the idea of delegation in both these papers to consider incentive regulation
in a dynamic, non-commitment, principal-agent context. Our focus is more normative,
however: we take for granted the presence of political mechanisms to identify, and del-
egate to, regulators and focus instead on the e ects of such delegation. Speciﬁcally, we
consider the simplest regulatory problem studied in La ont and Tirole (1993).4 The reg-
ulator wishes to realize a number of projects yielding a ﬁxed gross surplus. There are
two types of ﬁrms—low and high e ciency types—but the regulator does not know which
type she is dealing with. This is a classic principal-agent asymmetric information problem.
The regulator designs an incentive scheme consisting of two cost-reimbursement contracts
4Evans et al. (2011) demonstrate that the results are robust to wider settings; see Section 2.
3linking payments to the ﬁrms with observable costs. In two-period contracts the best
outcome can be achieved if some commitment mechanism is in place that prevents the
regulator from re-optimizing after one period, on the basis of revealed information about
the ﬁrm (Baron and Besanko (1984)). We assume such a mechanism is not in place, but
the government can delegate the choice of incentive scheme to an independent regulator
who holds o ce at least for the duration of the two-period contract. We examine whether,
and in what circumstances, a careful choice of regulator type can provide a better outcome
than leaving regulation in the hands of a representative regulator with the same prefer-
ences as the government. By explicitly modelling this dynamic environment, we ﬁnd that
an important inﬂuence here is the way the regulator’s type can a ect the resulting equi-
librium: more pro-industry regulators induce greater separation, which, in turn, allows
cost-reducing e orts to approach ﬁrst-best levels. Given the complexity of this regulatory
game, we do not consider mechanisms for choosing the regulator (though see Evans et al.
(2011)). However, as our earlier discussion indicates, the nature of our results would be
robust to such extensions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
sets out the complete information solution. Section 3 solves for a two-period, two-type
delegation equilibrium under asymmetric information, in which the regulator’s preferences
di er from those of the appointing government. Section 4 presents the welfare analysis
using simulations and Section 5 concludes the paper and indicates how our paper may
contribute to the wider research agenda on regulatory independence.
2 The Model
The Set-up
We begin by setting out the basic elements of the delegation game. There are two periods.
Costs are observed by the regulator and given by
Ct =     et; t =1 ,2 (1)
where e is e ort, and   is an e ciency parameter. Neither e ort nor e ciency are observed
so the regulator faces both an adverse selection and moral hazard problem. The e ciency
parameter   takes two values,   and  , which the regulator believes with probabilities  t
4and 1    t respectively at the beginning of period t.
Single-period payo s for the ﬁrm and regulator are
Ut = rt    (et);   ,     > 0 for et > 0,  (et) = 0 otherwise (2)
Wt = S   (Ct + rt)+ Ut    (Ct + rt);   ,     > 0
= S   (    et +  (et)+Ut)+ Ut    (    et +  (et)+Ut)
= W(Ut,e t; , ) (3)
In (2),  (et) is the disutility of e ort. In (3), S is the gross ﬁxed surplus of the project,
rt is a cost-contingent reward paid by the regulator to the ﬁrm in addition to the cost
Ct and  (.) is the disutility from tax distortions arising from the tax burden Ct + rt. In
equation (3) S (Ct+rt)  (Ct+rt) is the consumer surplus and the weight   is the weight
placed on the ﬁrm’s proﬁt by the regulator. A utilitarian regulator would have   = 1, but
in this paper we examine the e ect of delegating to a regulator chosen to have di erent
preferences. Suppose that the government has preferences deﬁned by   =  s   1 where
 s < 1 would apply to a more egalitarian government. Then a choice  >  s signiﬁes a
‘pro-industry’ (pro-rent) regulator type whilst  <  s signiﬁes an ‘anti-industry’ regulator
type.
Our treatment of tax distortions is an important distinctive feature of our set-up.
Suppose the public sector consists of services provided by n projects of the type considered
here, each costing T to the taxpayer. Then the total disutility from tax distortions is a
function of nT, f(nT) say. Most taxes involve deadweight losses which the public ﬁnance
literature suggests to be quadratic in the tax rate (see, for example, Stiglitz (1988)). The
cost per project,   = f(nT)/n, should therefore also be quadratic. Assuming a general
quadratic form we then write
 (T)= T + µT2 (4)
This general formulation of the set-up encompasses LT as a special case by putting   =1
and µ = 0.5
5As noted in the Introduction, Evans et al. (2011) presents a model with a number of our current as-
sumptions relaxed. In particular, in the context of the same two period game with asymmetric information
about   and et it allows for price regulation (not transfers), moral hazard over investment as well as e ort,
and it endogenises the choice of regulator ( ) in a Grossman and Helpman (2001)-style lobbying game. In
5Complete Information Contracts
In each period t, the regulator designs contracts (rt,Ct), and (rt,Ct) for low and high cost
types respectively, corresponding to levels of e ort et =    Ct and et =    Ct, and rents
Ut = rt  (et) and Ut = rt  (et) respectively. In a multi-period contract with complete
information there is no learning and therefore no source of dynamics. The multi-period
problem then reduces to repetitions of the static single-period one. We therefore drop the
time subscript in what immediately follows.
The regulator’s problem can be regarded as choosing any two from four variables:
transfers, costs, rents and levels of e ort for the two contracts, although the actual choice
variable is the transfer conditional on costs. Throughout this paper we ﬁnd it convenient
to formulate the problem in terms of choosing rent and e ort. Under complete informa-
tion, the regulator’s problem in each period is then:
For each type of ﬁrm  , choose U and e to maximize W(U,e; , )
where the social welfare is given by equation (3), subject to the individual
rationality constraint U   0.
With general functional forms for  (.) and  (.), the solution to this program is given
by e = e  and U = max(0,U ) where e  and U  are solutions to
  (e )=1 (5)
and
  (    e  +  (e )+U )=    1 (6)
Equation (5) equates the marginal disutility of e ort with its marginal social product.
Equation (6), which is only relevant if the rationality constraint does not bind, equates
the marginal disutility from taxes with the marginal utility of rent.





this setting, the beneﬁts of independence can be magniﬁed (because of their e ects on investment as well
as e ort), though the range of equilibria is much larger and, as such, the current setting helps to single
out the role of independence.
6which sets the disutility from negative e ort at zero. Then equations (5) and (6) give
e  =1 (8)
U  = U ( , )=
    1       µ(2    1)
2µ
(9)
The social welfare function now takes the form
W(Ut,e t; , )=S   (1 +  )(    et + e2
t/2)   (1 +      )Ut
 µ(    et + e2
t/2+Ut)2 (10)
The ﬁrst-best is then achieved under complete information with a representative regu-
lator of type  s. Then U = max(0,U ) = 0 for both types and the ex ante expected
intertemporal social welfare over two periods is given by
 FB =( 1+ )[v1W(0,e  ; ,  s)+( 1  v1)W(0,e  ; , s)] (11)
Now suppose that the government delegates to a regulator of type      s. Then for
 < where   =1+  + µ(2    1), the rents for both types of ﬁrm are still zero, but
for     [ , ] where   =   +2 µ(     ), the e cient type alone receives positive rent
up to a maximum di erence of U   U =   , where    =      . In this range the
regulator will allow rents only for the e cient ﬁrm because the lower costs are su cient
partly to o set the cost of ﬁnancing the rent. As long as µ>0, this rent is determinate.
For  >  the regulator is su ciently pro-rent to allow both types of ﬁrm to receive
positive rent with U   U =   . Thus, the role of higher   regulators is apparent in the
sense that, even with complete information, they allow the regulated ﬁrm to earn rents;
unlike the baseline model in LT.6 Figure 1 illustrates these results which are summarized as
Proposition 1
For su ciently pro-industry regulators, under complete information e cient
ﬁrms receive more rent up to a maximum di erential of magnitude U U =   .
FIGURE 1 HERE
6We have seen that LT’s baseline model sets   =1a n dµ = 0. This means that  <  , which also
induces the ‘no rent’ outcome in our model.
73 Two-Period Contracts under Asymmetric Information
This section sets out and solves a two-period, two-type delegation game with the basic
structure described in Section 2. Asymmetric information in the form of both an adverse
selection and moral hazard problem introduces dynamics through the process of learning
about the ﬁrm’s type. The regulator’s optimization problem and the ﬁrms’ individual
rationality constraints are now intertemporal and we assume that these are expressed
in terms of a common discount factor given by  . The ratchet e ect can be avoided if
the regulator can commit to a two-period contract, but we rule out this possibility. The
government however is committed to a particular regulator. The sequence of events for
the delegation game is given by:
1. The government has preferences as for the regulator but with rent carrying a weight
 s (reﬂecting social welfare) and delegates to a regulator of type    =  s for the two
periods. In the absence of delegation, the regulator is ‘representative’ and adopts a weight
  =  s.
2. The ﬁrm knows her type  ; the regulator has the prior  1.
3. The regulator o ers the ﬁrst-period contract which the ﬁrm accepts/rejects.
4. First-period e ort e1 is applied, the cost C1 is realized and observed by the regulator.
5. The regulator updates her prior v1 to v2.
6. The regulator o ers a second-period contract which the ﬁrm accepts/rejects.
The appropriate equilibrium concept for this game is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
(PBE) which imposes three requirements: ﬁrst, at each information set the player with
the move must have a belief regarding which node has been reached. Second, given their
beliefs at each information set the current move and subsequent strategies must be op-
timal given the beliefs and subsequent strategies of the other players. Third, beliefs are
determined by Bayes’ Rule and the players’ equilibrium strategies. We solve for this equi-
librium by backward induction beginning with the second period contract.
The Second-Period Contract
The regulator designs contracts (r2,C2), and (r2,C2) for low and high cost types respec-
tively, given the (updated) probability  2 that the ﬁrm is e cient. This corresponds to
e orts e2 =   C2 and e2 =   C2. Suppose that the e cient (low cost) type mimics the
ine cient type by producing at the observable high cost C2. It can do this by exerting
8e ort e2    =˜ e2, say,7 where we recall that    =     is the e ciency gap between the
two types. (Note that mimicking e ort by the e cient ﬁrm can be negative). Similarly
the ine cient type can mimic the e cient type by exerting e ort e2 +    = ˜ e2. The
incentive compatibility constraints for each type of ﬁrm to prefer the contract designed for
itself are then
IC2 : r2    (e2)   r2    ( ˜ e2) (12)
IC2 : r2    (e2)   r2    (˜ e2) (13)
The individual rationality constraints are:
IR2 : r2    (e2)   0 (14)
IR2 : r2    (e2)   0 (15)
Note that IC2 +IR2   IR2 so we can ignore the latter. As in LT we also ignore IC2 for
now and we can conﬁrm later that the solution in fact does satisfy this constraint.
As for the complete information case, it is convenient to formulate the problem in
terms of the choice of rent and e ort levels bearing in mind that contracts are designed as
transfers, contingent on observed costs. Then the relevant constraints can be expressed in
the form:
IC2 : U2   U2 +  (e2)    (˜ e2)=U2 +  (e2) (16)
IR2 : U2   0 (17)
where we have denoted informational rents by  (e2)= (e2)    (˜ e2). The regulator’s
problem, to be carried out at each information set characterized by the state variable  2,
is now:
Choose (U2,e2) and (U2,e 2) to maximize the expected welfare
E[W2( 2)] =  1 =  2W(U2,e 2; , )+( 1   2)W(U2,e2; , ) (18)
subject to IC2 and IR2.
7Throughout the paper we adopt the following notation: ˜ x is some outcome for the e cient ﬁrm who
mimics the ine cient ﬁrm and ˜ x is the corresponding outcome for the ine cient ﬁrm who mimics the
e cient ﬁrm.
9If       then the regulator’s welfare is decreasing in rent and the constraints IC2
and IR2 must bind. But a su ciently pro-rent regulator will always be willing to o er
the unconstrained optimal rents max[0,(     )/(2µ)] and max[0,(     )/(2µ)] for the
e cient and ine cient ﬁrms respectively and the constraints may cease to bind. We
return to this point later in this section when we characterize completely one possible
equilibrium.
If the regulator reserves the option to forego the project in the event that the ﬁrm
reveals itself as ine cient, then it may o er only one contract designed for the e cient
type. This will imply rent max[0,U ( , )] and e ort e , and yield an expected welfare
 2 =  2W(U ( , ),e  ; , ) (19)
The expected welfare in the ﬁnal period is then max( 1, 2).
The First-Period Contract
In the ﬁrst period, in general we must consider equilibria in which the e cient ﬁrm may
mimic the ine cient and vice versa. Suppose that the e cient ﬁrm chooses the low cost
contract with probability x and the high cost contract with probability 1   x. Similarly
suppose that the ine cient ﬁrm chooses the high cost contract with probability y and the
low cost contract with probability 1 y. Then we have three possible types of equilibrium:
Type I: IC1 and IR1 bind and the e cient ﬁrm may mimic the ine cient ﬁrm with
probability x.
Type II: IC1 and IR1 bind and the ine cient ﬁrm may mimic the e cient ﬁrm with
probability y.
Type III: IC1, IC1 and IR1 bind and both ﬁrms may mimic the other.
LT show that type II cannot be optimal for the regulator for the case where   =1
and µ = 0. In our simulations we can conﬁrm that this still holds for our more general
case where    = 1 and µ>0. In view of these results we concentrate on equilibria of types
I and III.
FIGURE 2 HERE
Consider ﬁrst a type III equilibrium. The extensive form of the game is shown in
10Figure 2.8 At information set A (B) a low (high) cost contract has been chosen by the
ﬁrm in period one. Given the mixed strategies, the probabilities of arriving at A and B
are:
Pr(A)= 1x +( 1   1)(1   y) (20)
and
Pr(B)= 1(1   x)+( 1   1)y (21)
respectively. Then by Bayes’ Rule we have






 2(B) = Pr(ﬁrm is e cient | high cost contract has been accepted)
=
 1(1   x)
Pr(B)
(23)
Let the rent obtained by the e cient ﬁrm when it mimics the ine cient ﬁrm be given
by
˜ U1 = U1 +  (e1)    (˜ e1) (24)
where we recall that ˜ e1 = e1     . Similarly let the rent obtained by the ine cient ﬁrm
when it mimics the e cient ﬁrm be given by
˜ U1 = U1 +  (e1)    (˜ e1) (25)
where ˜ e1 = e1 +   . Then the ﬁrst-period incentive compatibility and individual ratio-
nality constraints are given by:
IC1 : U1 +  U2( 2(A))   ˜ U1 +  U2( 2(B)) (26)
IC1 : U1 +  U2( 2(B))   ˜ U1 +  U2( 2(A)) (27)
IR1 : U1 +  U2( 2(A))   0 (28)
8In accordance with our general notation, W 1 = W(U1,e 1; , ) is the ﬁrst-period social welfare re-
sulting from the e cient ﬁrm choosing the contract designed for itself and ˜ W 1 = W(˜ U1,˜ e1; , ) is the
corresponding welfare when it mimics the ine cient ﬁrm. W 1 = W(U1,e1; , )a n d ˜ W 1 = W(˜ U1,˜ e1; , )
are similarly deﬁned.
11IR1 : U1 +  U2( 2(B))   0 (29)
It is clear that IC1+IR1   IR1 so that, as for the second-period contract, we can ignore
the latter.
The optimization problem for the regulator of type   is now:
Choose (U1,e1) and (U1,e 1) to maximize
E(W1 +  W2)= 1[xW(U1,e 1; , )+( 1  x)W( ˜ U1,˜ e1; , )]
+(1    1)[yW(U1,e1; , )+( 1  y)W( ˜ U1,e 1 +   ; , )]
+ E(W2) (30)
where
E(W2)=P r ( A)E(W2 | A)+P r ( B)E(W2 | B) (31)
subject to IC1, IC1 and IR1.
This completes the formulation of a type III equilibrium. The computation of a type
I equilibrium now follows by dropping the constraint IC1,p u t t i n gy = 1 and noting that
information set A now becomes a singleton in ﬁgure 2, ie,  2(A) = 1.
Solution for a Type I Separating Equilibrium
This sub-section completely characterizes a type I separating equilibrium (ie with x = 1)
and produces some analytical results. Of course equilibria are endogenously determined
by the incentive scheme which the regulator chooses to maximize its welfare function.
However it is instructive to focus on the simplest equilibrium and we examine later by
simulations the parameter values for which it is relevant. In fact for all parameter values
examined we ﬁnd in Section 4 below that all type I equilibria are separating, though for
some parameter values the regulator may design contracts that result in type III equilibria.
In a type I separating equilibrium  2(A) = 1 and  2(B) = 0 and the second-period
problem for the regulator is the complete information program set out in Section 2. To
recap, for our chosen functional forms we have:
e2 = e2 = e  =1 (32)
12U2 = max[0,(     )/(2µ)] (33)
U2 = max[0,(     )/(2µ)] (34)
In the ﬁrst period, the IC and IR constraints are now
IC1 : U1 +  U2(1)   ˜ U1 +  U2(0) (35)
IR1 : U1 +  U2(0)   0 (36)
In equations (35) and (36), U2(1) and U2(0) are the second-period rents the e cient
and ine cient ﬁrms respectively receive when they reveal their types; ie U2(1) = U2 given
by equation (33) and U2(0) = U2 given by equation (34). U2(0) is the second-period rent
the e cient ﬁrm receives when it mimics the ine cient type in the ﬁrst period (although
this never happens in a separating equilibrium); ie U2(0) = U2+ (e2)  (˜ e2)=U2+ (e2).
Similarly from (24) ˜ U1 = U1 +  (e1). We can therefore write constraint IC1 as
IC1 : U1   U1 +  (e1)+ ( (e )+U2   U2) (37)
The second discounted term in (37) is the familiar ratchet rent.
We also know that U1   (   )/(2µ), the unconstrained optimal rent. It follows that
for   su ciently high, IC1 does not bind and then
U1 =(      )/(2µ) (38)
For  > , IR1 does not bind either and then
U1 =(      )/(2µ) (39)
The solution of a type I separating equilibrium is completed by choosing (U1,e1) and
(U1,e 1) to maximize  1W(U1,e 1; , )+(1  1)W(U1,e1; , ) subject to IC1 and IR1.
The solution to this program is:
e1 = e  =1 (40)
U1 = max[0,(     )/(2µ)] (41)
U1 = max[U1 +  (e1)+ ( (e )+U2   U2),(     )/(2µ)] (42)
 1  (e1)(        2µU1)+( 1   1)(1   e1)[1 +   +2 µ(    e1 +  (e1)+U1)] = 0 (43)
13if IC1 binds, otherwise e1 = e  = 1. From (42), the ﬁrst term in (43) is negative. It
follows from (43) that e1 < 1; ie, the ﬁrst-period e ort of the ine cient ﬁrm is always
below the ﬁrst-best until   reaches a point where IC1 ceases to bind.
The equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 3. This shows iso-transfer curves for the two
types of ﬁrm in rent-e ort space. As described earlier, the complete information equi-
librium would involve e1 = e1 = 1, with the level of rent depending on the regulator’s
preferences. (In the ﬁgure,  < is assumed, so that U1 = U1 = 0; the complete in-
formation equilibrium is at point A.) Incomplete information allows the e cient ﬁrm to
mimic the ine cient one by putting in less e ort (˜ e1). Absent any dynamic considerations,
the regulator counters this by reducing e1 and r1, which in turn lowers ˜ e1 and r1 and,
therefore, ˜ U1: the equilibrium would be at B and D (given  <  ). However, in type I
equilibrium, the e cient ﬁrm surrenders in period 1 its chance to mimic again in period
2. Accordingly, the regulator must make an additional transfer to buy o  this future
“information rent”. This ratchet e ect moves the equilibrium to B and E and the ratchet
rent is DE.9
FIGURE 3 HERE
Now consider the e ects of raising  , the extent to which the regulator is pro-industry.
For social welfare, as we have just seen, the key variables are e1, the ratchet rent and U1.
We consider these in turn.
Solving (43) we can calculate the e ect of delegation on the e ort of the ine cient ﬁrm
in the ﬁrst period, e1 = e1( ). Di erentiation of (43) and some algebraic manipulation
then leads to the following proposition (which also summarizes the discussion after (43)).
Proofs of this and the subsequent proposition are given in Appendix B.
9We can also use ﬁgure 3 to illustrate the circumstances in which a type III equilibrium emerges. Recall
that this involves the   ﬁrm mimicking the   ﬁrm by providing e ort ˜ e1 = e1 +   . Clearly, when ˜ e1
is to the right of point F we have a type I equilibrium, while ˜ e1 to the left of point F yields a type III
equilibrium. Hence, the larger is the extra rent due to the ratchet e ect, the greater the prospects of a
type III equilibrium.
14Proposition 2
Consider any   below the value for which IC1 ceases to bind. Then in a type
I separating equilibrium the ﬁrst-period e ort of the ine cient ﬁrm, e1( ), is
below the social optimum and increases with  .
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is that given IC1, the more pro-industry, pro-rent
regulator will make a choice of e1 that gives the e cient ﬁrm more ﬁrst-period informa-
tion rent  (e1) even though the overall rent U1 may fall, as we shall see. High information
rent for the e cient ﬁrm implies high e ort by the ine cient ﬁrm.
Now consider the ratchet rent  ( (e )+U2  U2), the last term in (37). Suppose that
a representative regulator has a weight on the ﬁrm’s proﬁt  s <  ; for instance in the
set-up of LT,   =1<  . Then U2 = U2 = 0 and the ratchet rent is   (e ). By contrast
if the regulator is su ciently pro-industry, we know from proposition 1 that U2   U2 can
be as low as     with the ratchet rent falling to  ( (e )     ). This shows that in a
type I separating equilibrium, the ratchet rent is reduced by delegation to a su ciently
pro-industry regulator.
Finally consider the total ﬁrst-period rent U1. Consider the range of regulator types
 < where we recall that   =1 +  +µ(2  1) and   =  +2µ(   ). Then U2 = U2 = 0,
the ratchet rent is una ected by  , and from (37)
dU1
d  =   (e1)de1
d  > 0, from Proposition
2. Hence U1( ) increases with  . Next consider the range of regulator types     [ , ].
Then from (33),
dU1
d  = 1
2µ. Suppose we narrow the range in     [ , ] to that for which
IC1 binds. Then di erentiating (36) with the equality, we have
dU1
d 







From Proposition 2, the ﬁrst term in (44) is positive. Furthermore in the proof of Proposi-
tion 2 in Appendix B this ﬁrst term is shown to increase with the discount rate  . However
it is also shown in Appendix B that the second term dominates as   increases. Hence there
is a lower bound   such that if  > and IC1 binds then U1( ) decreases with  . Appendix
B derives the following conservative lower bound  :
  = max
 
2µv1(  )2
(1   v1)(1 +  )
,
2µv1
(1   v1)(1 +  )
 
(45)
For   su ciently large IC1 ceases to bind and U1 =(      )/(2µ). Then U1( ) starts to
15increase with  . These results are summarized in the proposition:
Proposition 3
Consider a type I separating equilibrium and delegation to a pro-industry reg-
ulator of type  >  s. Then if  <  , the ratchet rent is una ected and the total
ﬁrst-period rent to the e cient ﬁrm, U1( ), increases with  . For     [ ,  ],
in the range for which IC1 binds, the ratchet rent decreases and providing
that the discount factor is su ciently high, U1( ), decreases with  . As   rises
above this range, IC1 ceases to bind, and U1( ) once more increases with  
FIGURE 4 HERE
Figure 4 illustrates the e ects of increasing   within [ , ] for  > with IC1 binding.
From Proposition 2, e1 increases to e1
 , the iso-transfer curve shifts outwards and the
equilibrium for the ine cient ﬁrm in the ﬁrst period shifts from B to B . In the absence
of the second period, the information rent would increase by DD , the ﬁrst term in (44).
However the ratchet rent decreases from DE to D E , the di erence being the second term
in (44). Since  > the second of these e ects dominates, the iso-transfer curve for the
e cient ﬁrm shifts inwards and the overall ﬁrst-period rent for the e cient ﬁrm U1 falls.
Taken together Propositions 2 and 3 show that providing the discount factor is su -
ciently high, there exists a range     [ ,  ] for which the ﬁrst-period e ort of the ine cient
ﬁrm rises from a level below its social optimum and the total ﬁrst-period rent of the ef-
ﬁcient ﬁrm falls. Thus the ﬁrst-period social welfare calculated using the true weight  s
must rise in this interval. However in the interval  < delegation does not provide any
incentive for the e cient ﬁrm to reveal itself and social welfare will fall.
In this section we have established that delegation to a su ciently pro-industry regu-
lator can raise ﬁrst period social welfare. However it also implies a commitment to raising
the e cient ﬁrm’s rent in the second period and therefore a welfare loss for that period.
If the former e ect outweighs the latter then delegation to a pro-industry regulator of
some type within     [ , ] will raise intertemporal social welfare. We demonstrate this
possibility in the next section using simulations.
164 Welfare Analysis
This section studies the total intertemporal welfare e ects of delegation to a pro-industry
regulator. The degree to which the regulator is pro-industry is captured by the parameter
  in her single-period welfare function, equation (3). Consider the range of regulator types
    [ , ] where we recall that   =1+ +µ(2  1) and   =  +2µ(   ). From Section
2 we have seen that for   within this range, under complete information only the e cient
ﬁrm receives rent given by U  =(    )/(2µ). In a type I separating equilibrium it follows
that in the second period we have U2 = U  and U2 = 0. As we have also seen, e ort is
at its e cient levels for both types of ﬁrm. In the ﬁrst period e1 = e  = 1, U1 = 0, e1 is
given by equation (43) and from (42) we then have that
U1 = max[ (e1)+ ( (e )   U ),(     )/(2µ)] (46)
The intertemporal expected social welfare under delegation is calculated from the wel-
fare function of the government (with weight   =  s   1 <  ) and is given by
 ( )= 1W(U1( ),e  ; ,  s)+( 1   1)W(0,e1( ); , s)
+ [ 1W(U ,e  ; ,  s)+( 1   1)W(0,e  ; , s)] (47)
Without delegation the regulator has the same preferences as the government and
assigns the true weight  s to rent when designing the incentive scheme. Then the in-
tertemporal welfare becomes
 ( s)= 1W(U1( s),e  ; ,  s)+( 1   1)W(0,e1( s); , s)
+ [ 1W(0,e  ; ,  s)+( 1   1)W(0,e  ; , s)] (48)
Delegation to a pro-rent regulator of type   is then welfare-enhancing i   ( ) >  ( s);
ie, i 
 1[W(U1( ),e  ; ,  s)   W(U1( s),e  ; ,  s)]
+(1    1)[W(0,e1( ); , s)   W(0,e1( s); , s)]
>    1[W(0,e  ; ,  s)   W(U ,e  ; ,  s)] (49)
The left-hand-side of this inequality is the potential ﬁrst-period welfare gain from delega-
tion discussed after Propositions 2 and 3; the right-hand side is the second-period welfare
17loss from delegation discounted at the rate  . This arises because delegation implies a
commitment to positive rent for the e cient ﬁrm after revelation which reduces welfare
calculated using  s   1.
Simulations
We have carried out a large number of simulations for combinations of parameters  s,
 ,  , µ,  ,  1 and   and here we report an interesting selection. Our objectives in these
simulations are twofold: ﬁrst to demonstrate the possibility that a lowering of the ratchet
e ect and an increase in the ﬁrst-period e ort of the ine cient ﬁrm, through delegating to
a pro-industry regulator, can lead to ﬁrst-period welfare gains su cient to outweigh the
discounted second-period welfare loss; second, to investigate the combinations of parame-
ter values that might enhance this e ect.
FIGURES 5a and 5b HERE
First consider a baseline selection of parameter values:  s = 1,   = 1,   =1 .5,
µ =0 .25,   = 0,   =0 .95 and  1 =0 .5. For these parameter values (45) gives   =0 .5.
Thus  > and Proposition 3 applies. S is assumed to be su ciently large to prevent the
regulator o ering only one contract to the e cient ﬁrm on the basis of its priors. Figure
5a plots the ﬁrst-period rent of the e cient ﬁrm, U1, and the ﬁrst-period e ort of both
types of ﬁrm e1 and e1 against the regulator type  . Figure 5b plots the intertemporal
welfare gain from delegation calculated as the absolute gain [ ( )  ( s)] expressed as a
percentage of the welfare gap between the ﬁrst-best (realized under complete information
and with the weight on rent   =  s) and the welfare without delegation  ( s). Thus the
welfare gain is given by
G =
( ( )    ( s))
( FB   ( s))
  100 (50)
where  FB is given by (11),  ( s)) by (48) and  ( )) by (47).10
For the baseline parameter values we ﬁnd that   =1 .25 and   =1 .5. Then for  < 
the optimal incentive scheme induces a separating type III equilibrium in which incentive
10The comparison of  ( ) with the ﬁrst-best welfare outcome  
FB actually underestimates the value
of delegation as a commitment mechanism because optimal contracts with commitment and incomplete
information are still second-best.
18compatibility constraints bind for both types of ﬁrm and x = y = 1.11 For  > we
obtain the important result that delegation induces an equilibrium change: a switch from
type III to type I where constraint IC1 no longer binds. It turns out that the optimal
contract is now a separating type I with x = 1 and Propositions 2 and 3 apply.
The constraint IC1 ceases to bind at a value   =ˆ   given by
U1 +  (e1)+ ( (e2)+U2   U2)=(ˆ      )/(2µ) (51)
and U1 is then given by (42). This switch occurs at ˆ   =1 .45. For     [ , ˆ  ], U1 falls and
for  >ˆ  , U1 starts to rise again, all as predicted by Proposition 3. In the type I equilib-
rium, e1 rises as predicted by Proposition 2. This provides the potential for welfare gains
from delegation. Figure 5b shows that potential is realized for this particular combination
of parameter values. As the weight   increases from   =  s = 1, delegation leads to a
slight welfare loss until   reaches the interval     [ , ˆ  ] when U1 starts to fall sharply and
the ﬁrst-period e ort of both types approach the ﬁrst-best. These changes are su cient to
ensure that the ﬁrst-period welfare gain outweighs the second-period loss. The welfare gap
is closed by around 15% in these ﬁrst baseline simulations. Beyond   =ˆ  , the regulator
becomes too pro-industry and intertemporal social welfare drops sharply.
FIGURES 6a and 6b HERE
The trajectories for ﬁrst-period e ort in the region where a type III equilibrium exists
require further explanation. Constraints IC and IC given by (26) and (27) respectively
imply the following relationship between the ﬁrst-period e ort of the two types of ﬁrm:
e1 = e1      +  /(  )[U2( 2(B))   U2( 2(A))] (52)
(see A.17 in the Appendix). For baseline parameters we obtain a type III separating
equilibrium (x = y = 1). Hence v2(A) = 1 and v2(B) = 0. For  < we then have that
U2(v2(B)) = U2(0) =  (e ) and U2(v2(A)) = U2(1) = 0. Thus (52) becomes
e1 = e1      +  /(  )[ (e )] (53)
11The calculations of type III equilibria and of type I semi-separating follow the same lines as the
separating equilibrium set out in Section 3. Full details of these computations which generalize those of
LT, Appendix 9.9, to the case where    =1a n dµ>0 can be obtained from the authors.
19For baseline parameters this gives e1 > e1 and the di erence is constant throughout this
equilibrium.
Now consider variations about these baseline values. The baseline value for the dis-
count factor   =0 .95 is plausible for a time-period of one year. Suppose that we interpret
the single period as a regulatory review period within which the regulator cannot change
the contract. If this is increased from one to ﬁve years then the discount factor in the
model decreases to   =0 .955 =0 .77 which is still greater than  . Figure 6a and 6b
show this case. For this lower discount factor the optimal contract induces only a type I
equilibrium which again turns out to be separating. This is as expected from the analysis
of LT, chapter 9. Now delegation only induces a better type I equilibrium rather than a
switch between type III and type I. As predicted by Propositions 2 and 3, e1( ) increases
throughout the range of  ; U1 ﬁrst increases for  <  , decreases in the range [ , ˆ  ] and
increases for  >ˆ  . The corresponding welfare gain from delegation is now smaller at
around 10%.
FIGURES 7a, 7b and 7c HERE
Next we examine the e ect of increasing the discount factor  . Figures 7a to 7c show
results for   = 2. High values of  >1 are a simple way of modelling a short-term followed
by a long-term contract without abandoning the two-period set-up of this paper and of
LT. For low values of  , the regulator now designs contracts that induce a pooling type
III equilibrium in which the ine cient ﬁrm mimics the e cient ﬁrm with a probability
1   y close to unity and the e cient ﬁrm mimics the ine cient ﬁrm with a probability
1   x close to 0. The actual values of x and y are shown in Figure 7b. Now delegation
to an increasingly pro-industry regulator has the e ect of gradually inducing separation
until, at a value of   well within the interval     [ , ], a switch to type I occurs. Because
delegation plays the additional role of inducing separation, the welfare improvement is
now rather higher, closing the welfare gap by over 20%.
The trajectories for the ﬁrst-period e ort in the type III equilibrium are now rather
di erent from those in Figure 5a. Because for   close to unity the type III equilibrium
is close to a pooling type we have that v2(A)   v2(B) and hence from (52) we now have
20for low   that e1 < e1. However as   increases this encourages the regulator to induce
separation and we then revert to e1 > e1 as before.
FIGURE 8 HERE
Finally Figure 8 returns to baseline values and recalculates the welfare assuming that
the social welfare of the government is measured using  s =0 .4,0.8,1.2 instead of the util-
itarian  s = 1. Lower values of  s would apply to egalitarian governments who would wish
to redistribute rent, whilst the higher value would apply to a government with opposite
preferences. Results indicate that very egalitarian governments would obtain no beneﬁt
from delegation whilst a government that is itself pro-industry with  s =1 .2 would see
its measure of welfare rising by almost 40%.
5 Conclusions
This paper has examined whether delegation to an industry regulator whose preferences
di er from those of the government can act as a partial substitute for full intertemporal
commitment by mitigating the ratchet e ect. We have found that this indeed is the
case: by delegating to an independent regulator who is more pro-industry than itself,
the government can reduce the ﬁrst-period rent of the e cient ﬁrm and raise ﬁrst-period
welfare su ciently to o set the second-period costs from higher rents. We also ﬁnd a
second beneﬁt from such delegation: in some circumstances, a su ciently pro-industry
regulator is able to induce a separating equilibrium, which allows ﬁrms’ cost-reducing
e orts to converge towards their ﬁrst-best levels, thus again raising intertemporal welfare.
A strong example of this arises when the discount factor is high. Here, the regulator’s
willingness to allow future rent removes the ine cient ﬁrm’s incentives to mimic its e cient
counterpart and, hence, encourages earlier separation. Both of these results provide new
justiﬁcations for the widespread use of independent regulators in a variety of countries.
The ability to alleviate time inconsistency problems is not the only advantage of reg-
ulatory independence. It also compensates for the policy uncertainty that results from
21changing political majorities12, may help to recruit scarce experts in complex industries13
and can serve to de-politicise decision-making in static as well as dynamic situations.14
Many of these beneﬁts are described in Trillas (2010), Levine et al. (2005) and Evans et al.
(2008). At the same time, there are clearly costs to independence. Our model has identi-
ﬁed the welfare e ects of delegation to excessively pro-industry regulators, while Bernstein
(1955) provides an early insightful discussion of several others. One of these is that inde-
pendence does not necessarily ﬁx, so much as relocate, the commitment problem, which
becomes one of the government ﬁnding it di cult to commit to preserving the indepen-
dence of regulators (see Trillas and Montoya (2011) and Hauge et al. (2010)). In similar
vein, Posen (1993) argues that regulatory independence is just a consequence of a prefer-
ence for commitment, but not its real cause. Besides, independent regulators may ﬁnd it
more di cult than ministries to coordinate with the rest of government, which is costly
when there are gains from cooperation due to policy externalities. In addition, politicised
regulators may sometimes be useful in order to drive change and overcome inertia or resis-
tance to change, for example in liberalization processes. Despite these counter-arguments,
empirical evidence shows in general that regulatory independence has positive e ects on
network expansion and e ciency, as summarized in Trillas (2010), Edwards and Waver-
man (2006) and Cambini and Rondi (2010). The literature on the selection method of
regulators also shows both theoretically and empirically that appointed regulators fare
better in terms of facilitating investment than elected regulators Besley and Coate (2003),
a result the authors interpret as suggesting beneﬁts from avoiding regulatory over-reliance
on particular stakeholders (perhaps the equivalent of our intermediate ranges for  ).
We believe that our model can be amended to further the above research agenda in
a number of ways. For example, questions of the appropriate level of independence are
closely related to ones of regulatory capture that have been studied elsewhere in the regula-
12See Faure-Grimaud and Martimort (2003)
13However, expert commissions are not free from behavioral biases, as pointed out by Landier and
Thesmar (2010), pages 171-195.
14The recent IEAE report into Japan’s nuclear crisis at Fukushima identiﬁed a lack of independent
regulation as the reason why the hazard posed by tsunamis to nuclear plants had been underestimated;
see IAEA (2011), Lesson 16). Similar arguments in favour of de-politicising such sensitive regulation are
behind the British Health and Safety Executive’s proposals to create an independent O ce of Nuclear
Regulation.
22tion literature. Typically, capture is regarded as ine cient to the extent that it wastefully
uses resources and may distort regulatory decisions. However, our model suggests that a
ﬁne line may exist between the beneﬁts of pro-industry regulators and e ects of capture
itself. Consideration of this issue would require us to treat explicitly the capture process
(and to endogenize the wasteful expenditures it involves), in a manner similar to Boyer and
La ont (1999) recent treatment of lobbying for environmental regulation. Such a focus on
the political economy aspects of regulation should also be extended to endogenising the
choice of regulator (Baron (1988), Spulber and Besanko (1992); more generally, see La ont
(2000). It would be interesting, for example, to examine Baron’s political equilibrium for
circumstances when majority voting favours pro-industry, as opposed to pro-consumer,
regulation.
In a related paper, we have taken some steps in this direction, and demonstrated
beneﬁts to regulatory independence in related settings. These have included ones where
the regulator’s ‘type’ is endogenised in a lobbying game, and where both investment and
price regulation feature as part of the regulatory set-up (see Evans et al. (2011)). Similarly,
Levine et al. (2005) uses a complete information model to show that delegation can help
correct underinvestment problems. The current paper deliberately focuses on a simple
regulatory environment in order to emphasize the role of delegation but it is interesting
that beneﬁts remain (often in enhanced fashion) in these related settings. Future research
may also generalize the model we have used. Thus, an inﬁnite time horizon would capture
more explicitly the importance of future considerations (currently captured by the discount
rate alone). Additional issues could also be addressed by considering the role of delegation
in regulating product quality, an area where dynamics without commitment can generate
ine ciencies.
Our paper suggests that the choice of regulator matters when a government is dele-
gating regulatory authority, and when the costs and beneﬁts of regulatory independence
are being assessed. The above suggestions set out an interesting agenda for research to
enhance our understanding of the potentially important role played by this choice. More
generally, the achievement of adequate levels of ex ante decisons such as managerial e ort
or investment depends on a number of policy and institutional instruments taken often
by a variety of jurisdictions. Acemoglu (2010) for example argues that more e cient
23instruments may trigger more costly rent seeking unless there are su cient checks and
balances. Sinn (2004) analyzes how in a context of increasingly integrated markets states
compete for mobile factors combining instruments such as taxation or investment in local
infrastructures. The implications of this debate on instruments and jurisdictions for the
regulation of network industries are preliminary explored by Trillas (2008).
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26A Details of Equilibria
This Appendix sets out the details of the equilibria used in the paper. It is essentially
a generalization of LT, section A9.9, to allow for delegation to a pro-industry regulator
with the weight on rent  >1, and for quadratic tax distortions. The general procedure
for computing the equilibria is as follows. First we look for a type I equilibrium. Assume
that the e cient ﬁrm chooses the low-cost contract with probability x which is given, for
the moment. Then solve for given x resulting in a pair of contracts and a social welfare
function that are functions of x. The regulator then chooses a pair of contracts that
maximizes the social welfare with respect to x, which is then endogenously determined by
the e cient ﬁrm. Having computed the type I equilibrium we then check that the IC1
constraint holds and is not binding. If this is not the case then we make IC1 bind and
proceed to calculate the type III equilibrium. For both types I and III, the second-period
solution for a given probability  2 is given by:
Second-Period Solution
The problem is to choose (U2,e2) and (U2,e 2) to maximize
E[W2( 2)] =  2W(U2,e 2; , )+( 1   2)W(U2,e2; , ) (A.1)
subject to
IC2 : U2   U2 +  (e2)    (˜ e2)=U2 +  (e2) (A.2)
IR2 : U2   0 (A.3)
where informational rents are given by  (e2)= (e2)    (˜ e2) and ˜ e2 = e2     . The
social welfare function takes the form
W(Ut,e t; , )=S   (1 +  )(    et +  (et))   (1 +      )Ut
 µ(    et +  (et)+Ut)2 (A.4)
If the value function in (A.1) is less than  2W(max[0,U ( , )],e  ; , )] where
U ( , )=(      )/(2µ) then only one contract is o ered designed for the e cient type
and the ine cient ﬁrm closes.
For su ciently low   the IC2 and IR2 constraints will bind, but as   increases ﬁrst the
IC2 and then the IR2 constraints cease to bind. Then the regulator will o er contracts de-
manding optimal e ort with unconstrained optimal rents
27U ( , )=(      )/(2µ) and U ( , )=(      )/(2µ) for the e cient and ine cient
ﬁrm respectively. Thus we have:
U2 = max[(     )/(2µ),0]
U2 = max[(     )/(2µ),U2 +  (e2)] (A.5)
Now express U2 consistent with (A.5) as U2 = U2(e2). The problem now is to choose
e2,e2 to maximize
 2W(U2(e2),e 2; , )+( 1   2)W(U2,e2; , ) (A.6)
The ﬁrst order conditions then give:
e2 = e  (A.7)
 2(        2µU2)
dU2
de2
+( 1   2)(1     (e2)[1 +   +2 µ(    e2 +  (e2)+U2] = 0 (A.8)
where
dU2
de2 =   (e2)i f(      )/(2µ) < U2 +  (e2), and
dU2
de2 = 0, otherwise. For the rest
of the solution and for our simulations we choose  (e)=1 /2[max(0,e)]2. Then e  = 1,
  (e2)=e2 if e2      and   (e2)=    otherwise. Given  2, equations (A.8) and (A.5)
give solutions e2 = e2( 2) and U2 = U2( 2) and the social welfare at nodes A and B:
E(W2 | A)= 2(A)W(U2( 2(A)),e  , , )+( 1   2(A))W(U2,e2( 2(A)), , ) (A.9)
with an analogous result for E(W2 | B). This completes the second-period optimization
problem.
First-Period Solution:Type III
It is convenient to set out the type III equilibrium procedure ﬁrst. Given x and y, the
optimization problem for the regulator of type   is to choose (U1,e1) and (U1,e 1)t o
maximize
E(W1 +  W2)= 1[xW(U1,e 1; , )] + (1   x)W( ˜ U1,˜ e1; , )]
+(1    1)[yW(U1,e1; , )] + (1   y)W( ˜ U1,e 1 +   ; , )]
+ E(W2) (A.10)
where
E(W2)=P r ( A)E(W2 | A)+P r ( B)E(W2 | B) (A.11)
28subject to IC1, IC1 and IR1 given by:
IC1 : U1 +  U2( 2(A)) = ˜ U1 +  U2( 2(B)) (A.12)
IC1 : U1 +  U2( 2(B)) = ˜ U1 +  U2( 2(A)) (A.13)
IR1 : U1 +  U2( 2(B)) = 0 (A.14)
where
˜ U1 = U1 +  (e1)    (˜ e1), (A.15)
˜ U1 = U1 +  (e1)    (˜ e1) (A.16)
where ˜ e1 = e1      and ˜ e1 = e1 +    are mimicking levels of ﬁrst-period e ort.
For type III equilibria both IC constraints must be binding. This will not be the case
for high values of   for which only type I equilibria are possible. (We conﬁrm this in the
simulations). For the rest of the solution we assume that  < . Then U2 = 0 and the
IR1 constraint becomes U1   0 which must bind for contracts to be optimal.
Constraints IC1 and IC1 above imply the following relationship between the ﬁrst-
period e ort of the two types of ﬁrm:
e1 = e1      +  /(  )[U2( 2(B))   U2( 2(A))] (A.17)
From (A.15) and (A.16) ˜ U1 = ˜ U1(e1) and ˜ U1 = ˜ U1(e1,e 1). Hence using (A.17), the
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where
  (e1)=e1 if e1     
=    if e1      (A.20)
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=  (1 +      )   2µ(    et + e2
t/2+Ut) (A.23)
The intertemporal welfare loss (A.10) can now be calculated using the solutions above for






 1x +( 1   1)(1   y)
(A.24)
 2(B)=
 1(1   x)
Pr(B)
=
 1(1   x)
 1(1   x)+( 1   1)y
(A.25)
The type III equilibrium is ﬁnally obtained by maximizing the intertemporal welfare
with respect to x and y using a standard numerical maximization procedure.15 First-
Period Solution:Type I
Given x, the optimization problem for the regulator of type   is to choose (U1,e1) and
(U1,e 1) to maximize
E(W1 +  W2)= 1[xW(U1,e 1; , )] + (1   x)W( ˜ U1,˜ e1; , )]
+(1    1)[W(U1,e1; , )] +   ; , )]
+ E(W2) (A.26)
where
E(W2)=P r ( A)E(W2 | A)+P r ( B)E(W2 | B) (A.27)
subject to IC1, and IR1 given by:
IC1 : U1 +  U2( 2(A)) = ˜ U1 +  U2( 2(B)) (A.28)
IR1 : U1 =0 (A.29)
where
˜ U1 = U1 +  (e1)    (˜ e1), (A.30)
The rest of the solution follows almost as before putting y = 1 so that Pr(A)= 1x,
Pr(B)= 1(1   x) and  2(A) = 1. The only other change arises from the fact that in
15All the numerical calculations were performed using MATLAB.
30the ﬁrst period the constraint IC1 may cease to bind for high  . Then in a separating






=   (e1)i f(      )/(2µ) < ˜ U1 +  (U2( 2(B))   U2(1))
= 0 otherwise (A.31)
The type I equilibrium is ﬁnally obtained by maximizing the intertemporal welfare with
respect to x using a standard numerical maximization procedure.
B Proof of Propositions 2 and 3
Proposition 2
Di erentiating (43) with respect to   and using (44) we obtain
e 
1( )=  1/ 2 (B.1)
where
 1 =( 1 +  ) 1  (e1)
 2 =( 1    1)(1 +   +2 µ[(1   e1)2 + C1 + r1])    1   (e1)(        2µU1)
+2 µ(  (e1))2
We can now show that all the terms deﬁning  1 and  2 are positive hence proving propo-
sition 2.  1 is positive because   (e1) > 0. The ﬁrst term in  2 is positive because total
transfers to the ine cient ﬁrm, C1+r1, are positive. Since   (e1) > 0 and    (e1)   0t h e
second and third terms are non-negative if U1   (     )/2µ, which always holds because
(     )/(2µ) is the unconstrained optimal rent for the e cient ﬁrm.
Proposition 3




(1 +  ) 1( (e1))2




if (1  1)(1+ ) >2µ 1( (e1))2. For the case where e1 >   , the ﬁrst-period mimicking
e ort of the e cient ﬁrm is positive and   (e1)=   . For the case where e1 <   ,t h e
31ﬁrst-period mimicking e ort of the e cient ﬁrm is negative and then   (e1)=e1   1. It
follows that a conservative lower bound for which if  > then
dU1
d  < 0 is given by
  = max
 
2µ 1(  )2
(1    1)(1 +  )
,
2µ 1
(1    1)(1 +  )
 
(B.3)
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Figure 8. Intertemporal Welfare Gain. Baseline values with s=0.4, 0.8, 1.2 
 